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Wittgenstein, Dewey, and the
Practical Foundation of Knowledge
Jörg Volbers
1 In our time, when classical philosophy of language has long lost its sovereign position in
the philosophical field, it is no longer surprising nor unusual to classify Wittgenstein (his
later works) and Dewey as both belonging to the same family of pragmatists, understood
in a broad sense.1 They both express a common position which can be roughly defined as
claiming ‘the  primacy of  practice.’  They  argue  that  certain  subjects  of  philosophical
discussion, such as meaning, logical necessity, intentionality and understanding, have to
be understood as primarily rooted, or anchored, in our practical sayings and doings. If we
want to improve our understanding of what we actually do and believe, we have to look at
practice.
2 Given this background, it is nonetheless surprising how different in form and outlook
their  philosophies  are.  The  differences  in  style  immediately  catch  one’s  eye.
Wittgenstein’s  writings  have  often  been  credited  with  a  highly  poetical  quality.  His
thinking  is  divided  into  short,  sometimes  aphoristic  paragraphs;  he  uses  questions,
elliptical remarks, and dialogue; he employs images and similes; he does not quote nor
discuss opposing theories explicitly. Dewey, for his part, is much more professional in this
respect. He wrote books, treatises and short essays in which he continuously developed
his  central  themes  and  presented  them  in  a  (more  or  less)  systematic  manner.  He
suggested  answers  to  classical  philosophical  problems  and  argued  against  dissenting
theories. The poetic ring of mysticism and aphorism is rather alien to his literary style.
Russell  Goodman  gives  us  an  accurate  picture  of  the  experience  of  reading  Dewey:
“Dewey, I always feel, talks at, rather than to, or with, his readers” (Goodman 2002: 165). It
is exactly the impression of being spoken to that distinguishes Wittgenstein’s writing
when it is at its best. He draws the reader into his thought, which, by the way, can also be
rather disorienting.
3 These  differences  in  style  correspond  to  a  rather  fundamental  divergence  in  their
principal outlook. Dewey was, like the pragmatist movement in general, keenly optimistic
about the possibility of  making the world a better place.  He advocated the power of
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reflection and praised the progress of experimental science as a paradigm for reflective
thinking,  inquiry,  in  general.  Wittgenstein was  a  cultural  pessimist.  He also  saw ‘our
civilization’ as characterized by progress, but he expressed deep mistrust about the idea.
The Philosophical Investigations begins with a quotation from Nestroy: “Progress always
appears much greater than it actually is.” Even though one might argue about whether
Wittgenstein’s thinking is  inherently conservative,2 it  is  surely,  as von Wright put it,
“anything but ‘prophetic.’ It has no vision of the future; rather it has a touch of nostalgia
about the past” (Von Wright 1982: 115).
4 How should we judge these differences in style and outlook? It would be superficial to
simply dismiss them, especially if one adopts a pragmatic way of thinking. If the primacy
of practice has any value, then it is to remind us that the way we do things is not secondary
to the things done. But then, of course, it would be equally superficial just to take these
first  impressions  at  face  value.  My  thesis  is  that  they  point  to  a  more  substantial
difference, one which concerns the very core of their philosophies. Even though both are
concerned with the primacy of practice,  they have quite a different understanding of
what this appeal to practice, in the end, amounts to. So the difference I am aiming at
actually concerns the very idea of philosophy itself, as both ‘pragmatists in the broad
sense’ understand it. What does it mean to ‘look at the language-games,’ as Wittgenstein
urges us? Why should we put our trust in experience and action, as Dewey invites us?
5 These methodological questions can be reformulated in a way that allows us to treat them
more directly. The problem is: What is it that we expect from philosophy, what do we
want to learn from engaging in it? What knowledge, or what kind of knowledge, does
philosophy provide? In particular: What kind of knowledge does the appeal to practice
provide? The topic  of  knowledge  is  omnipresent  in both philosophers’  writings.  Their
being classified as belonging to one broad family of pragmatists owes a great deal to the
fact that they develop quite parallel views of what knowledge is, and what it cannot be.
Here  is  the  short  story:  Both  Wittgenstein  and  Dewey  criticize  the  traditional
philosophical  idea  that  knowledge  is  a  distinctively  mental  phenomenon,  something
residing in a ‘subject’ which is categorically divided from the world it is acting upon, the
‘object.’ The world is not something which is ‘viewed’ from the outside, as it were. Instead
of indulging in the futile “spectator theory of knowledge,” they instead put the emphasis
on the necessary connection between knowledge, on the one side, and skills, habits, or
capacities on the other. Wittgenstein writes: “Knowledge is an ability”;3 Dewey follows
the pragmatist  tradition in arguing that  knowledge is  primarily embodied in flexible
habits. It is practice which comes first, be it in the form of habits, skills, language-games
or (as Dewey likes to call it) ‘conjoint behaviour.’ What we experience is a product of this
practical involvement, not the other way around. No surprise then that pragmatism (in
the broad sense)  has  been claimed to be right  in the line of  Kantian transcendental
philosophy, albeit with a realist leaning (Pihlström 2004).
6 Seen from this  perspective,  Wittgenstein’s  ‘pessimism’  as  well  as  Dewey’s  ‘optimism’
regarding progress can be seen as expressing a different attitude toward this practically
embedded  knowledge.  Stanley  Cavell  had  a  good  eye  for  that.  What  is  missing  in
pragmatism, he wrote, is a sensitivity for ‘the depth of the human restiveness’ (Cavell
2004: 3). Varying upon a theme that he has more systematically exposed in the first part
of his Claim of Reason, Cavell uses the subject of knowledge in order to demonstrate what
he means by this. What singles out Wittgenstein as an opponent of pragmatism, Cavell
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claims,  is  the  former’s  attitude  toward  knowledge.  Cavell  describes  it  as  a
‘disappointment,’ one which is akin to to skepticism, but yet substantially different:
Wittgenstein’s disappointment with knowledge is not that it fails to be better than
it is (for example immune to skeptical doubt), but rather that it fails to make us
better than we are, provide us with peace. (Cavell 2004: 3)
7 Two conclusions can be drawn from this statement. Its first is that pragmatism upholds
the  belief  in  knowledge;  it  hopes  that  knowledge can ‘make us  better  than we are.’
Conversely,  Cavell  holds that  Wittgenstein sees a limit  to the capacity of  knowledge,
limits which affect his philosophy as a whole. These two conclusions do not only align
with  the  differences  in  philosophical  outlook  with  which  this  paper  began  –  Dewey
putting his trust in science and progress, Wittgenstein mistrusting it deeply. It will also
explain, I believe, their differences in style and finally in method. Thus, the pragmatic
conception of knowledge which is shared by both authors – that knowledge is somehow
‘constituted’ through practice, or ‘embedded’ in it – turns out to be the pivotal point from
which to assess their respective differences.
8 I  will  begin,  then,  by  elaborating Dewey’s  understanding of  knowledge and practice,
always keeping an eye on the question concerning the implications it has for the role of
philosophy (Cavell’s ‘making us better than we are’). I will then turn to Wittgenstein and
try to show how his  latest  remarks,  collected in On Certainty  (1968),  support  Cavell’s
judgment.  In these remarks Wittgenstein introduces a distinction which is  foreign to
Dewey, namely, that we might well have practically upheld “certainties” which do not
correspond to knowledge, that is, that neither express it nor stand in an instrumental
relation to it. These certainties point to other ways we are related to the world and to
others.  I  will  call  this  Wittgenstein’s  discovery  of  the  essentially social  dimension  of
practice. For him, our practical standing in the world is not primary upheld by practically
acquired  certainties,  but  by  the  dynamic  net  of  responses,  expectations  and
disappointments in which we are embedded. Knowledge and inquiry, from this point of
view, lose their sovereign position as the most serious game in the town.
 
Dewey’s Inquiry Into Inquiry
9 Does it make any sense to say that for Dewey knowledge ‘makes us better than we are,’ as
Cavell’s  statement  implies?  Dewey’s  characterizations  of  knowledge and knowing are
ambiguous in that respect.  There is,  for one,  his straight rejection of a philosophical
tradition which conceives of knowledge in terms that are all too high and too theoretical.
Following  the  well-trodden  path  of  religion,  philosophy  had  detached  theoretical
activities from practice, placing itself firmly on the side of theory. It took thinking to be a
contemplative art,  theoria in the Greek sense,  dealing “with a realm of higher Being”
(Dewey  1988:  11).  Knowledge,  then,  is  thought  of  as  being  something  immutable,
something which ideally does not change and thus provides us with insights into reality
as it is. ‘Knowing,’ in the traditional sense, as Dewey reconstructs and criticizes it, can
thus serve a fundamental need: It provides a means to fulfil the human, all-too-human,
‘Quest  for  Certainty’  by  giving  the  knower  access  to  something  which  holds  fast.  It
establishes a certainty which is beyond all doubt. The doctrine of ‘pure knowing’ thus
forms an essential part of the tradition Dewey criticizes: “Quest for complete certainty
can  be  fulfilled  in  pure  knowing  alone.  Such  is  the  verdict  of  our  most  enduring
philosophic tradition” (Dewey 1988: 7).
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10 Dewey’s  criticism  of  this  traditional  conception  of  knowledge  is  a  fine  example  of
dialectical reasoning. He does not argue directly against the ‘Quest for Certainty,’ but
rather tries to show that it fails on its own terms. The knowledge it seeks, Dewey claims,
cannot  be  had  because  we  cannot  rid  ourselves  of  uncertainty.  Uncertainty  is  the
“distinctive characteristic of practical activity […] Of it we are compelled to say: Act, but
act at your own peril. Judgment and belief regarding actions to be performed can never
attain more then precarious probability” (Dewey 1988: 5). This is not a direct refutation of
the traditional claim, since it leaves intact the possibility that we shift the grounds. A
defender  of  the  tradition  might  argue  that  we  have  to  concentrate  on  theoretical
knowledge  precisely  because Dewey’s  characterization  of  practical  activity  is  correct.
Dewey’s task, then, is to point out that this conclusion rests on an untenable dualistic
separation of these two ‘realms’ of theory and practice. One important argument to that
purpose is Dewey’s historical claim that this separation reflects a mere cultural prejudice.
The high esteem of theory conforms to the values of a social elite which devalues and
depreciates  the activities  of  those “lower” classes on which it  depends (Dewey 1988:
21-39). If we drop that prejudice, we will see that the separation between knowledge and
action has no real grounds – theory is also an activity.
11 Having  reached  this  point,  one  might  conclude  that  Dewey  invites  his  readers  to
completely dismiss the traditional estimation of knowledge. Being on a par, both theory
and practice have to rely on a disloyal ‘practical activity.’ Does this not imply that the
inherent uncertainty of practice also extends to theoretical activities? Here the ambiguity
of Dewey’s position becomes visible. He rejects the traditional praise of ‘pure knowing,’
but he still holds knowledge in high esteem. What has changed is the ground upon which
we assert the value of knowledge. For Dewey, the destruction of the traditional barrier
between knowledge and action frees our minds for a better (or more justified) appraisal
of knowledge’s real value. It helps us to see that we do, as a matter of fact, possess quite
numerous certainties. There is knowledge; but it cannot be found where philosophy has
looked for it. It is embodied in those impure and ordinary works of artisanry which have
been ignored by the tradition.4 As opposed to philosophers, these practitioners do not
waste their time with “framing a general theory of reality, knowledge and value once for
all,” but are rather occupied with “finding how authentic beliefs about existence as they
currently exists can operate fruitfully and efficaciously” (Dewey 1988: 36). These men and
women just act, and in acting, they devise tools, understanding and values.5
12 It is a misunderstanding to believe that Dewey’s philosophy glorifies science. Science, for
Dewey, is important because it best exemplifies the general pattern exhibited by these
practical activities. The tremendous success of science is not based on its superior mode
of reflection or ratiocination in the way traditional philosophy understands it, but rather
on  its  picking  up  the  impure  methods  and  practical  inclinations  of  artisanry.6
Experimental science embodies “the actual procedures of knowledge” (Dewey 1988: 38)
and thus form the model of what Dewey considers to be the one and only way to gain
knowledge in the face of the uncertainties of practice. This pattern, as it is well known, is
called inquiry.
13 I  have  taken  the  trouble  to  establish  such  a  well-known  key-concept  of  Dewey’s
philosophy in order to show how utterly realistic his understanding of knowledge is. This
is not intended to mean that he has ‘found the right thing,’ but rather that his trust in the
power of  inquiry is  firmly based on facts (or so he claims).  Dewey’s method aims at
confronting philosophical presumptions with what he considers to be a more realistic
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picture of what we do. If the topic in question is knowledge, we have to go and look at the
actual  procedures  in  which  knowledge  is  gained.  Instead  of  defining  knowledge
beforehand  and  then looking  for  its  manifestations,  we  will  rather  gain  a  better
understanding of what we are actually looking for by first looking at the practices in which
knowledge  is  operative.  “The  fundamental  advantage  of  framing  our  account  of  the
organs and processes of knowing on the pattern of what occurs in experimental inquiry is
that nothing is introduced save what is objective and is accessible to examination and
report” (Dewey 1988: 183).
14 This  whole  procedure bears  a  close  resemblance to  Wittgenstein.  Dewey would have
agreed  upon  statements  like  the  following,  which  can  be  found  in  the  Philosophical
Investigations: “For our forms of expression prevent us in all sorts of ways from seeing that
nothing  out  of  the  ordinary  is  involved,  by  sending  us  in  pursuit  of  chimeras”
(Wittgenstein 1969: sec. 94). Knowledge, we could say, is nothing out of the ordinary, it is
there,  and the traditional mistake is to assume that knowledge must have a specifally
‘pure’ form. Rather, it is the ordinary use – embodied in actual practice – which shows us
how the phenomenon in question is really to be taken. I take this to be the gist of what
Dewey calls his ‘denotative’ or ‘empirical’ method. In adopting for a realistic attitude, we
are not to begin with the “results of reflection” (Dewey 1981: 19), but rather look at how
reflection is done.
15 But there is a certain twist to Dewey’s approach which, as we will see, sets him apart from
Wittgenstein. Knowledge, for Dewey, is not just some conception among others to which
we can turn. To a pragmatist’s ear, Cavell’s contention that knowledge ‘makes us better
than we are’  must sound like a tautology.  For Dewey,  such a claim comes close to a
definition of what knowledge can sensibly be. Inquiry is always an attempt to improve our
situation and eventually our place in the world: “Anything that may be called knowledge,
or  a  known object,  marks  a  question answered,  a  difficulty  disposed of,  a  confusion
cleared up, an inconsistency reduced to coherence, a perplexity mastered” (Dewey 1988:
181).
16 Two aspects are important here. For one, Dewey’s understanding of inquiry has the effect
of insulating the uncertainties immanent to practice. Doubt is, as it were, only possible
locally; it arises in the form of problems within the confines of the objective ‘situation’ (as
Dewey calls it). Following Peirce, Dewey’s general pattern of inquiry assumes that we act
with full certainty, and it is the goal of inquiry to regain this capacity. The second point is
that inquiry, as Dewey understands it, is always a response to an objectively problematic
situation. Inquiry is not an idle, isolated activity. It is an essential part in our struggle to
cope with all the uncertainties that permeate our practical activities. We are obliged to
inquire.
17 The ubiquity of inquiry is obvious for those pre-intellectual, more or less subconscious
forms of reflective inquiry that are at work in our continuous bodily interaction with the
environment. But Dewey expands this pattern to include those elaborated practices by
which we consciously try to solve problems. To be sure, there is a decisive difference
between these  two poles  of  inquiry:  intellectual  inquiry  is  dependent  on  the  use  of
language, broadly understood as the capacity to use signs which embody meaning. It
allows the inquiring subject to relate the currently experienced traits of the situation to
past and future ones; it introduces rational discourse and the capacity to form distinctive
ideas about what to expect and what to do. But that modification, though it introduces a
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significant qualitative change, is according to Dewey but an extension of the original
organic disposition towards reflective interaction with the environment.7 
18 This short synopsis shows that knowledge, for Dewey, is something we cannot not have.
Inquiry is hardwired into our biological and cultural pattern of life; it is the principal
instrument of survival. It is the origin of all the certainties we have at our disposal. If
there is some stability and knowledge in a world that condemns us to act at our own peril,
it is the result of the inquiries which permeate our organic life and which define our
current place in history.
19 As  we  have  seen,  the  methodological  justification  for  this  view  is  the  idea  that  in
‘inquiring into inquiry,’ we are de facto just looking at what we really do. What is curious,
though, is that the result of this operation echoes the very idea from which it critically
parted: “The quest for certainty,” Dewey writes, “is a quest for a peace which is assured,
an object which is unqualified by risk and the shadow of fear which action casts” (LW4: 7).
In the context of this passage, it becomes clear that Dewey rejects this quest, belonging to
the faulty doctrine of ‘pure knowing.’ But what does Dewey’s philosophy offer us, if not a
new reason to find peace again? For the tradition, the quest for peace has been directed
towards the objects of knowledge. For Dewey, reassurance can be found in the truth of
inquiry. ‘Pure knowledge’ proves to be a quasi-religious dogma, but knowledge in the
pragmatic sense is everywhere. In submitting all knowledge to situational inquiry, Dewey
creates a stable frame wherein the content of inquiry might change, but in its very form it
remains stable.
20 We have seen that Dewey’s attitude towards knowledge and ‘peace’ has two sides. His
whole  philosophical  outlook  is  based  on  the  idea  that  every  practical  activity  is
threatened by uncertainty; we live in an instable world in which we cannot attain the
kind  of  knowledge  the  tradition  has  looked  for.  But  at  the  same  time,  this  very
contingency also forms our capacity to reflect. (“But where danger is/Deliverance also
grows,” Hölderlin would remark.) Inquiry itself is not a contingent practice, but the very
pattern by which life upholds itself. Inquiry and contingency are two sides of the same
coin. In the end, our knowledge is as certain as anything can be in this precarious world.
If we accept the world’s contingencies (by turning our back to the false demands of an
elitist tradition), we can again gain the peace philosophy has always been looking for.
 
Wittgenstein’s Remarks On Certainty
21 For Dewey, knowledge indeed does make us better and also provides us with some (non-
traditional) form of peace. Now it is time to investigate Wittgenstein’s attitude towards
knowledge and certainty. We set out with Cavell’s claim that Wittgenstein, as opposed to
pragmatists  such  as  Dewey,  was  ‘disappointed’  with  the  delivering  potential  of
knowledge.  This subject has been extensively treated by Cavell  under the heading of
‘skepticism.’  For  Cavell,  Wittgenstein is  not  a  skeptic  in the classical  epistemological
sense. He rather articulates the ‘truth’ of skepticism, which is, according to Cavell, that
“our relation to the world as a whole, or to others in general, is not one of knowing,
where knowing construes itself as being certain” (Cavell 1979: 45).
22 The  way  Cavell  reads  Wittgenstein,  an  interesting  contrast  with  Dewey’s  position
emerges. Both Wittgenstein and Dewey seem to be occupied with the problem of certainty
and its relation to knowledge, and both can be seen as acknowledging a certain truth to
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skepticism.8 Of course, neither Dewey nor Wittgenstein are straightforward skeptics.9 But
Dewey’s whole philosophy is based on the assumption that uncertainty is irrefutable, and
the presence of an encompassing state of doubt is Dewey’s definition of the beginning of
inquiry (Dewey calls  it  “the indeterminate situation,” cf.  Dewey 2008:  109-11).  So we
might say that Dewey transforms skepticism, tames it, as it were.
23 In order to see how Wittgenstein treats the topic of certainty, and how it contrasts with
Dewey, let us now turn to the collection of remarks which bears it in the title. On Certainty
is not a book which Cavell has discussed extensively, but I believe it can well illustrate the
very point Cavell – or Wittgenstein – is up to. There has been quite some discussion about
the right way to read On Certainty, and it has been argued that this last book represents a
new phase in his thinking, called the ‘third Wittgenstein.’10 I will concentrate here on one
point  that  particularly  attracts  attention:  Wittgenstein’s  style  of  argumentation  is
reminiscent  of  transcendental  philosophy,  since  he  is  investigating  the  necessary
conditions of the possibility of meaning and experience. For Sami Pihlström, these last
writings show that Wittgenstein, too, can be rightly called a ‘pragmatist.’ Their common
position is “that it is only against the background of our human form(s) of life, of our
habit of doing various things together in a common environment, that meaning and that
learning is possible” (Pihlström 2004: 298).
24 Of course, this kind of transcendental inquiry differs greatly from the classical Kantian
approach. Wittgenstein is not inquiring into reason, but rather looks at our practical
involvement as the ‘framework,’ or the ‘transcendental ground,’ which constitutes our
thinking.  Pihlström  introduces  the  nice  expression  ‘certainty-in-action’  in  order  to
illustrate this genuine practical dimension. Wittgenstein argues that language-games are
grounded  in  our  practical  actions,  in  certainties  which  we  do  not  doubt  “in  deed”
(Wittgenstein 1969: sec. 342). He likens these “primitive reactions” to the act of taking
hold of a towel (Wittgenstein 1969: sec. 510). In the beginning, we just do act in a certain
way, and this is the condition for any subsequent linguistic refinement and normative
assessment.
25 One particular  subject  where  this  transcendental  argument  comes to  the  fore  is  the
practice of learning, which plays a central role in Wittgenstein’s reflections.11 In order to
learn at all how to normatively assess an utterance, to give it sense, we first have to learn
to participate in the corresponding practice. This ‘entry’ into the language game, though,
is not itself rationally structured. It begins with imitation and obedience. The student (the
novice, the learner) first has to take for granted what the teacher tells her. “The schoolboy
believes  his  teachers  and schoolbooks”  (Wittgenstein 1969:  sec.  263).  This  is  a  logical
condition. Without such an “ur-trust” (as Moyal-Sharrock calls it),  there is no way to
acquire the competencies which define a language-game.12 These competencies go beyond
simple conditioning. They include forming an understanding of the point of the game, a
shaping of interest, and minimally a perception of the salient properties which mark the
actions and items of the language-game.
26 In the case of learning, we have a forceful illustration of how our “relation to the world
and to others,” as Cavell formulates it, “is not one of knowing.” Training in the sense
discussed here may include explanation, but firmly rests on non-epistemic factors such as
bodily  exercises,  authority,  trust,  love,  power,  and  of  course  the  ‘black  box’  of  the
individual (its talent, its wit,  its capacity to understand what the teacher is trying to
convey).  We  also  have  a  good  illustration  of  Wittgenstein’s  peculiar  version  of
transcendentalism: If sense and meaning depend upon (among other things) training, the
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acquired “certainty-in-action”  (Pihlström 2004:  299)  indeed constitutes  a  background
which is both necessary for understanding, and yet non-epistemic.
27 For  this  reason,  Pihlström feels  justified,  as  it  has  been remarked above,  to  include
Wittgenstein on the list  of  those “pragmatized” versions of  transcendentalism which
examine “the conditions for the possibility of some given actuality […] ‘from within’ the
sphere  (of  experience,  of  meaning)  constrained  and  limited  by  those  conditions”
(Pihlström  2004:  293).  And  the  similarities  to  Dewey’s  ‘empirical  method,’  which  is
looking at the ways we do in fact gain knowledge, cannot be denied. But there is an
important difference which Pihlström ignores.  In his  argumentation,  he continuously
employs the first person in plural form. It is ‘we’ who investigate the (practical) limits of
sense, and the conditions revealed are ‘ours,’ as are the practices. The inclusive ‘we’ is a
common stylistic element in all attempts to offer a full-fledged transcendental reading of
Wittgenstein, and it characterizes Dewey’s style as well. But this position, in which the
author assumes to be fully representative of the practice, misses Wittgenstein’s insistent
struggle to place the self,  or the ‘I,’  within this ‘we.’  I  take that to be Cavell’s major
discovery,  which  can  be  also  identified  in  On  Certainty.  There  we  find  numerous
references to the problem how we, as individuals, become a part of the practice, and to
what bars us from such a participation, respectively. As such, the topic of an irreducible
tension  between  the  practice  and  the  subject  who  participates  in  the  practice  is
introduced.
28 The prominent role of learning in Wittgenstein’s remarks already illustrates this point.
We  have  to  learn  in  order  to  participate.  That  this  process  of  learning  is  not  an
automatism upon which we can always  rely  –  like  a  machine  –  is  something  which
occupies Wittgenstein’s reflections in the Philosophical  Investigations (1967:  sec.  208).  A
transcendentalist reading, like McDowell’s (1984), would now point to the fact that we do
in fact learn and convey meanings, and that accordingly any philosophical skepticism is
just out of place. But this observation only captures one dimension of the normativity of
practices:  its  objectivity.  The  subjective  dimension  shows  up  when  Wittgenstein
discusses,  for  example,  those  fundamental  and  often  irreconcilable  clashes  of
understanding where each party calls the other a fool or heretic (cf. Wittgenstein 1969:
sec. 239, 611). On Certainty is not just interested in our certainties, but also explores their
limitations.  It  confronts  the  reader  with  strange  tribes,  improbable  evidence  (like
discovering sawdust in a head, sec. 211), men from Mars (sec. 430), mental disturbances
(sec. 71), illusions (sec. 19), drugs (sec. 676) and straight out madness (sec. 355, 281, 674).
29 Here we touch on an important point. If it is true that any substantial doubt already
presupposes a functioning language-game in which it can be judged, what then is the
opposite of certainty? It is true that we agree, often, in language; this practical agreement
is,  as  Wittgenstein  had  already  remarked  in  the  Investigations,  fundamental  for  our
capacity to understand each other. (Wittgenstein 1969: sec. 241) In these limit-cases of
sense just quoted, this precondition of sense collapses. Considering that agreement forms
a logical condition for the possibility of meaning, its lack cannot be stated in logically valid
terms. It is not a simple contradiction.13 
30 Doubt, as the contradictory of certainty, is something we can resolve by transforming it
into a problem. This is Dewey’s suggestion, the initial step of inquiry. But Dewey also
emphasizes that in itself, doubt is too indeterminate to guide action. It is necessary to
give it  a definite form by qualifying it  (cf.  Dewey 2008:  111f.).  The cases Wittgenstein
discusses in On Certainty refuse such a determination. The lack of agreement cannot be
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qualified in an objective way since it implies a “revision,” as Wittgenstein writes, which
“would amount to an annihilation of all criteria”14 (Wittgenstein 1969: sec. 492).
31 In that sense, the opposite of certainty is not plain doubt, but that irritating sense of
‘being wrong’ which is more rightly associated with the onset of madness. On several
occasions,  Wittgenstein  discusses  the  case  that  something  which  constitutes  the
ineliminable background of our understanding might be contradicted by everybody (cf.
Wittgenstein 1969: sec. 614). Madness is looming there, since we cannot imagine how a
world looks like in which these certainties are wrong. Wittgenstein emphasizes that this
madness  cannot  be  rejected  by  just  pointing  to  the  practice,  since  the  certainty  in
question is essentially subjective:
I, L.W., believe, am sure, that my friend hasn’t sawdust in his body or in his head,
even though I have no direct evidence of my senses to the contrary. I am sure, by
reason of what has been said to me, of what I have read, and of my experience. To
have  doubts  about  it  would  seem  to  me  madness  –  of  course,  this  is  also  in
agreement with other people; but I agree with them. (Wittgenstein 1969: sec. 281)
32 Note that the cases of uncertainty Wittgenstein discusses are mostly not the philosopher’s
doubts.  His  favourite  examples  are  children,  madmen,  historically  shifting
understandings or just strange confrontations with people whose convictions threaten
‘our’ certainties. These examples suggest that our life does not only consist of certainties,
but also of that irritating evidence which challenges our self-understanding. Things like
this happen, and they lead quite naturally – in deed, as Wittgenstein would say – to these
seemingly “nonsensical” questions of how we, as individual subjects, can hold fast to the
certainties that permeate our life.
33 Contrary to what the transcendental reading suggests, Wittgenstein is not assuring us
that, in face of these doubts, ‘we’ do know what is right, and what is not. He rather probes
our attitude towards certainty, traces it back to its origins (in learning), its conditions
(social and natural), expressions and variations. A teacher might cut off a young student’s
doubt with the harsh remark to stop interrupting, since his doubts do not yet make any
sense (Wittgenstein 1969:  sec.  310).  The grown-up philosopher,  though,  is  not  in the
position of a novice. James Conant’s reading (1998) that any skeptic or realist who tries
either to prove the external world or to refute it, is uttering plain nonsense, devoid of any
meaning,  is  not  Wittgenstein’s  position.  Wittgenstein  is  not assuming  the  teacher’s
position  towards  his  fellow  philosophers.  Even  though  he  clearly  sees  that  Moore’s
attempt to prove the external world by raising his hands is nonsense, he does not content
himself with that observation. He admits that these are attempts to “express something
which cannot  be expressed like that” and thus require “an investigation” in order to
identify  where  the  claim  went  wrong  (Wittgenstein  1969:  sec.  37;  cf.  sec.  76).  The
philosopher’s nonsense has some sense, expresses something, even though it cannot be
easily captured.
34 What emerges is a picture of a subject – “I, L.W.” – which struggles with the certainty to
which  it  finds  itself  bound  from  a  logical  point  of  view.15 This  is  what  I  mean  by
‘subjective’ dimension of certainty. Wittgenstein is neither a skeptic nor is he assuming a
plain  transcendental  position.  The  practically  constituted  certainties  belong  to  the
‘scaffolding’ of our thoughts (Wittgenstein 1969: sec. 211), but it is a certainty in which we
do  trust,  not  something  in  which we can  trust  (cf.  Wittgenstein  1969:  sec.  509).  The
certainty  which  forms  a  condition  of  all  thought  is  not  a  solid  ground;  it  can  be
questioned, and this questioning – if it is more than an academic exercise – requires an
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investigation  which  assumes  the  form  of  an  exploration.  This  observation  helps  to
understand Wittgenstein’s particular style of writing. Since our certainties are implied in
our very subjectivity, putting forth arguments cannot do all the work. We have to try to
show the other how we think they should think. And we should not believe that our own
position is immune to doubts and misunderstandings, since the way we have learned the
rules is itself dependent on an “indeterminate” (Wittgenstein 1969: sec. 28) practice: “Not
only rules, but also examples are needed for establishing a practice. Our rules leave loop-
holes open, and the practice has to speak for itself” (Wittgenstein 1969: sec. 139).
35 In this section, we have seen in what sense the skeptic is ‘disappointed’ by knowledge.
Wittgenstein is rejecting the common identification of knowledge with certainty, giving
the  latter  priority.  We might  be  certain  that  things  are  so  and so,  but  this  is  not  a
knowledge to which we can appeal in the face of the irritating counter-evidence which
Wittgenstein discusses. So there remains a gap between mind and world, a gap which
does  not  call  for  more  knowledge,  but  to  a  critical  investigation  of  the  place  such
knowledge plays in our life. These kind of ‘inquiries’ assume a completely different form
than in the work of Dewey. Since the foundation of our practices is non-epistemic, we
have to resort to non-epistemic means in order to clarify what it is we wanted to say,
what troubles us, or how to counter the irritating evidence which threatens our very
subjectivity. There is no definite form to these kinds of investigations; they should be
rather thought of  as constituting our intellectual  life – devices such as conversation,
analysis, comparison, exposure to new, strange or irritating experiences. The important
point is that they cannot be thought of as simply enriching or correcting our present
knowledge, but rather as ways to change the way we look at things, at ourselves and at
others.  They are,  as I  would like to put it,  practices of  the transformation of the self.
Philosophy is one of these practices – it is, as Wittgenstein claims in “Culture and Value,”
a “work on oneself.”16
 
Varieties of Practice
36 Our comparison of Dewey and Wittgenstein’s respective understandings of practice has
revealed  deep  differences.  For  Dewey,  practice,  though  inherently  uncertain,  also
constitutes the certain ground to which we should turn if we seek – in the light of the
irrefutable contingency – some orientation. This idea condenses in Dewey’s conception of
inquiry. The general pattern of inquiry is not just a practice, but also represents the very
form  of  our  coping  with  the  world;  its  form  remains  identical,  whether  inquiry  is
performed collectively or individually. In this way, Dewey can argue that we should put
all our trust into inquiry and its power to transform our experiences. The argument is
transcendental: we cannot not inquire, so to inquiry we should turn in order to re-adjust
our self-understanding.17 
37 Wittgenstein, on the other hand, is offering two arguments against this rationalization of
practice. He shows that our practical capacity to judge – the basis of inquiry – is itself
grounded in non-rational relations (“an ungrounded way of acting,” Wittgenstein 1969
sec. 110). Practices such as teaching assume non-epistemic means by which the subject, as
Meredith Williams (2000) calls it, is ‘calibrated’ in order to acquire the normative contrast
without which no sense is made. This includes behavioural conditioning, but extends to
such “non-epistemic” influences such as trust, acknowledgment, and the whole range of
means by which human beings govern each other.
Wittgenstein, Dewey, and the Practical Foundation of Knowledge
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV-2 | 2012
10
38 In  a  sense,  this  argument  picks  up  a  similar  point  as  Dewey.  Dewey’s  naturalistic
pragmatism points to the ‘integrated unity’ of organism and environment, inferring that
any reflection upon reflection has  to  take into account  that  this  unity is  the factual
starting point, the transcendental basis, from which any further act of differentiation has
to proceed. For Wittgenstein, this ‘integrated unity’ is better represented in the practice
of  learning.  In learning,  the individual  assumes the norms,  rules  and “views” of  the
practice into which it is initiated. It is integrated in the ‘environment’ of practice. But
contrary to Dewey, Wittgenstein does not believe that this logical unity holds fast over
time.  He  allows  for  disturbances  and overlapping claims,  for  irritating  evidence  and
unforeseen individual  confrontations.  So  Wittgenstein’s  second argument  is  that  our
initially  acquired  practical  certainty,  though  in  sense  a  transcendental  condition  of
thought, can turn out to be ‘wrong’ in the sense of ‘going mad’ described above. Note the
strict  logical  form this argument assumes:  Our knowledge which is  embedded in our
practically acquired certainties cannot be used to prove or refute our relation to the
world (and to others) precisely because our certainty does not reflect a prior state of the
world, but rather constitutes the transcendental ground of sense and meaning.
39 This difference between Wittgenstein and Dewey boils down, I  believe, to a diverging
assessment of the sociality of practice. For Wittgenstein, practice is an essentially social
form. This is why learning, as being something which requires someone else representing
the constitutive norms of the practice, plays such a pivotal role. Belonging to a practice
does not just mean to be involved in an activity, but also to be exposed to the judgments
and expectations of the others. This dependency also implies a certain vulnerability, to
which Wittgenstein was quite sensitive. After learning is done, this dependency does not
disappear.  It  creates  new problems which Wittgenstein discusses,  for  example,  in On
Certainty when everybody else openly contradicts you.  Thus,  the tension between the
subjective position and the objective demands of the practice emerges, a tension which
cannot be dissolved, but has to be explored.
40 For Dewey, the paradigm of practical activity is the individual (or organic) habit. Sociality
is  introduced  as  a  new  environment,  thus  retaining  the  general  ecological  logic  of
interaction  between  organism  and  environment.18 Language,  or  communication,  is
defined  as  the  collective  use  of  signs  in  order  to  attain  shared  experiences. Dewey
describes meaning as a “community of partaking” (Dewey 1981: 146), caused by the joint
use of symbols. Disagreement, accordingly, is just a failure of coordination and does not
form a  substantial  threat  to  meaning  and understanding.  It  is  at  this  point  that  the
contrast to Wittgenstein stands out most clearly. Both agree that language presupposes
agreement  in  order  to  function.  But for  Wittgenstein,  this  is  a  logical  insight,  which
consequently allows for the possibility of a mismatch between our inculcated subjective
logical certainties and their objective practical realisation. For Dewey, this agreement is
an  objective  presupposition,  the  failure  of  which  causes  confusion  and  weakens  our
intellectual powers, but does not weaken the general conviction that our practice is, as it
is, a secure foundation of all thinking.
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NOTES
1. Brandom’s family picture includes Kant, Peirce, James, Dewey, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Quine,
Sellars, Davidson and Rorty – and of course, himself (Brandom 2003: 40).
2. Cora  Diamond,  for  example,  exclaims  that  calling  Wittgenstein’s  philosophy  inherently
conservative is just ‘nutty’ (Diamond 1991: 34).
3. ‘Wissen ist ein Können’ (MS 164 from the Bergen Edition (2000), dated 1941).
4. Cf. in addition to the following also Ch. 4 of Dewey’s Experience and Nature (Dewey 1981: 100-31).
5. Garrison 1995 accordingly sees the ‘experience of working’ as the key to understand Dewey
and profitably compares this idea with the early works of Hegel.
6. This  thesis  has  also  been  defended  by  Hans  Blumenberg  1983,  who argues  that  scientific
progress  is  exactly  due to  the abandonment  of  speculative  reflection.  A  more contemporary
elobaration of the philosophical implactions of this idea can be found in Allen 2004.
7. Cf. Dewey (2008: 48-65).
8. Terry Pinkard 1999 argues  that  in  fact  all  philosophy of  the 20th century,  analytic,  post-
analytic as well as continental, has been driven by modern “experience of skepticism.”
9. John McDowell 1984 shows that Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein as a skeptic must fail.
10. For an overview of the different views on On Certainty, cf. Moyal-Sharrock & Brenner 2007.
For a discussion of the ‘third Wittgenstein,’ cf. Moyal-Sharrock 2004b.
11. As  Meredith  Williams  1999  has  argued,  the  topic  of  learning  is  essential  both  to
understanding the Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty.
12. Cf. Moyal-Sharrock (2004a: 97).
13. Cf. Wittgenstein (1983: sec. VI-49).
14. Anscombe  translates  the  German  original  “Maßstäbe”  with  “yardsticks”;  I  amended  the
translation since Wittgenstein is talking here of criteria in general. This being said, the yardstick
is Wittgenstein’s  favorite metaphor for these kind of  judgments which are immune to doubt
because they constitute the way we assess normative contrasts (Williams 1999).
15. “One  might  say:  ‘I  know’  expresses  comfortable  certainty,  not  the  certainty  that  is  still
struggling” (Wittgenstein 1969: 357).
16. Wittgenstein (1980: sec. 16e). I  develop this position more fully in my Selbsterkenntnis und
Lebensform (2009)  which argues that Wittgenstein’s  conception of  philosophy is  assuming the
traditional form of a ‘spiritual exercise,’ as Pierre Hadot calls it, and I extend this conception
with Foucault’s notion of a ‘practice of the self.’
17. Dewey’s  thinking here  is  Hegelian in  form and spirit.  The following quote,  for  example,
echoes  the  Hegelian  idea  that  we  are  not  just  contingent  byproducts  of  nature,  but  rather
embody a necessary dialectical step in the continous process in which the absolute (or nature)
tries to overcome its self-alienation through the means of self-knowledge: “In modern science,
learning is finding out what nobody has previously known. It is a transaction in which nature is
teacher, and in which the teacher comes to knowledge and truth only through the learning of the
inquiring student” (Dewey 1981: 122).
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18. “We may say […] that natural operations like breathing and digesting, acquired ones like
speech and honesty, are functions of the surroundings as truly as of a person. They are things
done by the environment by means of organic structures or acquired dispositions. The same air
that  under  certain  conditions  ruffles  the  pool  or  wrecks  buildings,  under  other  conditions
purifies the blood and conveys thought” (Dewey 1983: 15).
ABSTRACTS
Even though both Dewey and Wittgenstein have been rightly classified as both being ‘pragmatist’
thinkers in a broad sense, they stand in stark contrast with respect to their writing style and
their  general  attitude  towards  the  future  of  western  civilization.  This  article  reflects  these
differences and traces them back to their diverging conceptions of knowledge. Dewey criticizes
the philosophical tradition for erecting an artificial barrier between theory and practice, but he
retains  the  traditional  high  esteem  for  knowledge  by  re-describing  it  as  practical  inquiry.
Consequently, all practically acquired beliefs and certainties are either justified or a potential
subject-matter for further inquiries. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, shows the limitation of the
very idea of knowledge by pointing to the knowing subject’s fragile relation to its own lived
practices. He claims that there are practically acquired beliefs and certainties which are out of
reach for the inquiring subject. Thus, the seemingly superficial divergence in style and method
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